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Abstract 
 Since the Citizens United Supreme Court decision changed campaign finance 
laws in the United States, scholars have sought to determine the impact of different types 
of campaign financing on the political system. This paper serves to add to this research 
by answering the questions: given the freedom of outside spending now allowed by 
Supreme Court decisions such as Citizens United, how does ideology affect the relative 
amount of outside spending congressional candidates receive from sources other than 
their party committees? In turn, how does this affect polarization in Congress? Through 
examining the relationship between ideological extremism and relative levels of non-
traditional outside funding (i.e. excluding party committee spending) I found that, in 
certain cases, ideology may play a role in determining the amount of non-traditional 
outside spending candidates receive. My findings suggest that there is a negative 
relationship between the percentage of non-traditional outside funding and ideological 
extremism for incumbents in the House and that there is a positive relationship between 
non-traditional outside spending relative to traditional party spending only and 
ideological extremism for non-incumbents in the House. This indicates that ideologically 
extreme non-incumbents in the House rely more heavily on non-traditional outside 
spending relative to traditional party spending, which may have important implications 




 Campaign finance laws in the United States have long been subject to strict 
scrutiny. In 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments (FECA) were passed, 
creating limits on campaign contributions and imposing a formal system of transparency 
for donations.1 Over time, national party committees established non-federal financial 
accounts to raise money without limits, known as ‘soft money.’ In 2002, Congress passed 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BRCA, a.k.a. the McCain-Feingold Act), 
outlawing soft money and limiting corporate and labor union funding of electioneering 
communications. This marked a period of relatively stricter campaign financing 
regulations, that stood until 2010.2 In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens United 
v. FEC. Citizens United is a 501(c)(4) group (non-profit and tax-exempt group that 
operates under dark-money rules, meaning they do not have to report information about 
their donors) and was seeking to combat laws that prevented them from running a 2008 
campaign ad attacking Hillary Clinton, as corporations were not allowed to advocate for 
or against specific candidates. The Supreme Court sided with Citizens United and set the 
precedent for groups to directly contribute to PACs with advocacy positions and to fund 
advertisements that are not just issue-centric.3 This decision has caused a lot of 
controversy, as it treats corporations as people, allotting them the same first amendment 
rights. In April 2014, another Supreme Court case – McCutcheon v FEC – struck down 
_______________________________________________________________________	
1 “Campaign Finance Law,” The Campaign Finance Institute (CFI), www.cfinst.org/law.aspx.   
2 Ibid. 
3 Robert Mutch, Campaign Finance: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 7-9.  
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contribution limits for single donors, further signaling a shift towards less restrictive 
campaign financing laws.4  
Citizens on both sides of the ideological divide are wary about the influence of 
money on politics. Their worries have only been exacerbated following these several key 
court cases that have opened up politics to the influence of ‘big money.’ In particular, 
people are worried about the impact an increase in outside spending will have on the 
political process. ‘Outside spending’ is defined as “political expenditures made by groups 
or individuals independently of, and not coordinated with, candidates’ committees.”5 This 
includes both traditional groups, such as party committees, and non-traditional groups, 
such as PACs, super PACs, and 501(c)s. People have also raised concerns over the new 
laws allowing the wealthy to have a larger voice and influence on the vote, in a way 
allowing money to act as speech. In fact, 78% of Americans in 2015 said it the Citizens 
United case should be overturned.6 
 The Citizens United decision has given rise to a new type of campaign financing 
coined ‘dark money.’ Dark money is political spending by 501(c) organizations, “meant to 
influence the decision of a voter, where the donor is not disclosed and the source of the 
money is unknown.”7 Under the new precedent, corporations and wealthy individuals 
could have huge impacts on elections, and therefore politics, and the lack of transparency 
would keep citizens from ever knowing. This is worrying as, in the case of advertising, it 
_______________________________________________________________________	
4 CFI, “Campaign Finance Law.” 
5 “Outside Spending,” Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php.  
6 Greg Stohr, “Bloomberg Poll Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot,” 
Bloomberg, September 28, 2015,  https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-09-
28/bloomberg-poll-americans-want-supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot.  
7 CRP, “Outside Spending.” 
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makes it more difficult for voters to assess the validity of a message if they do not know 
who it is coming from.8  
The Citizens United case clearly also has an impact on Congress, as it changes the 
campaign and electoral processes. For the purposes of my research, I will be examining 
non-traditional outside funding (i.e. excluding party committees) as I am interested in the 
impact of outside groups. My thesis will focus on the research question: given the 
freedom of outside spending now allowed by Supreme Court decisions such as Citizens 
United, how does ideology affect the relative amount of outside spending congressional 
candidates receive from sources other than their party committees? In turn, how does this 
affect polarization in Congress? I will focus on the time period of 2002-2016. From 
2002-2010 campaign finance laws were relatively stricter, given the ban on soft money 
by BCRA. Once BCRA was struck down in 2010, outside spending was allowed to play a 
much larger role in the political system. This time period will allow me to introduce the 
Citizens United decision as a shock and examine its impact over time.  
 
Literature Review 
There is no consensus among the political science community surrounding the 
relationship between campaign financing and ideology. Previous work exists on how 
campaign financing affects polarization, but little has specifically focused on changes 
since Citizens United. While there is no argument against the fact that Congress has 
_______________________________________________________________________	
8 While some corporations do choose to partially or fully report dark money donations, they legally do not 
have to do so. For this reason, it is important to note that it is impossible to tell how truthful corporations 
are when reporting or how much money goes unreported. As a result, I am unable to examine the effects of 
dark money alone, as the validity of the data is highly questionable.  
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become increasingly polarized over recent years, few experts can agree on the underlying 
causes. Currently, there is not much literature on how ideology impacts outside funding.  
One study sought to relate polarization to money redistribution within parties.9 
The authors found that party leaders used to be ‘middlemen’ but have become 
increasingly ideologically extreme. “Whereas the ideological distance between the floor 
leaders had been an average of .099 points larger than that of the average member of the 
respective rank and file from the 86th to the 103rd Congress, it was suddenly .345 points 
greater in the 104th, more than double the previous high and three and a half times the 
average.”10 They attribute this drastic change to the effectiveness of ideological 
extremists at fundraising. As campaigns became increasingly more expensive, extremists 
excelled at fundraising and were able to take over the parties. The extremists then 
redistribute the funds among their party’s candidates in order to win their fellow party 
members over. This is particularly effective in helping extremists rise to positions of 
power: in both parties, the redistribution by party extremists is more significant than that 
by party centrists when it comes to leadership decisions. This study enforces the idea that 
extreme candidates are more effective fundraisers and are therefore more attractive to 
outside donors, but it does not delve into questions of how this ability to fundraise can be 
used to subvert the party system entirely.  
_______________________________________________________________________	
9 Eric Heberlig, Marc Hetherington, and Bruce Larson, “The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and 
the Polarization of Congressional Parties,” The Journal of Politics 68, no. 4 (November 2006): 
992-1005. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00485.x.  
10 Ibid., 993. 
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 However, another study found that the source of funding does not have an impact 
on polarization.11 The authors eliminated private donations in the New Jersey Assembly 
and predicted what voting behavior would have been when private donations were still 
present. They then introduced public funds and found little difference between the 
expected behavior of politicians when they received private donations and the actual 
behavior they displayed when they received the public donations. However, it is 
important to note that this study examines the impact of different types of campaign 
financing on ideology/legislative behavior and not the impact of ideology on receiving 
the funds themselves.   
 A study by Powell, on the other hand, found that campaign contributions can 
sometimes have an impact on legislative policy.12 Powell argues that it is difficult to 
ascertain the exact impact of donors on the legislative process. While many experts have 
not been able to find a direct influence on roll call votes, she utilized a blended model 
approach to study the influence of donations earlier in the legislative process. Powell 
examined set institutional and political factors to see if they properly predict the amount 
of time a legislator spends fundraising and the amount of influence of a campaign 
contribution. She found that donations are most influential for highly paid legislators in 
‘professionalized legislatures’ in states with large populations. Additionally, contributors 
have more influence when the legislator is more ambitious and plans on seeking a higher 
office. She also found that contributors have less influence when constituents are more 
_______________________________________________________________________	
11 Jeffrey Harden and Justin Kirkland, “Do Campaign Donots Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public 
Financing in the American States,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (February 2016): 119-
152.  https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12108.  
12 L.W. Powell, “The Influence of Campaign Contributions on Legislative Policy,” The Forum 11, no. 3 
(2013), 339-355, http://doi.org/10.1515/for-2013-0047.  
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highly educated and are more likely to be aware of how legislators are spending their 
time and money. These results led Powell to conclude that the focus of campaign finance 
research should be on when and where contributions have influence, as they can 
sometimes have a large impact and other times have little to no impact. This study shows 
that campaign contributions can sometimes play an important and influential role in 
politics, but again fails to further examine patterns in who is receiving this money in the 
first place and why.  
The nature of discussions surrounding the impact of different types of campaign 
financing has changed significantly since the 2010 Citizens United decision. A study by 
Ian Vandewalker for the Brennan Center for Justice examined the changes in outside 
spending in Senate races since this decision.13 He found that outside spending in Senate 
elections more than doubled from 2010 to 2014 and in 80% of competitive races in 2014 
outside spending was greater than candidate spending. The study also showed how this 
outside spending is being dominated by a small number of rich individuals: in every 
federal election following the Citizens United case, more than $1 billion has been spent 
via super PACs– of this $1 billion, approximately 60% was donated by only 195 
families. Additionally, the study looked into the increase in dark money spending alone, 
which also more than doubled in Senate elections since 2010. The increases in outside 
funding and dark money were especially prevalent in toss-up races, with dark money 
making up 71% of outside funding for the 11 closest races in 2014. While this study 
highlights the massive changes that have taken place in the campaign financing world 
_______________________________________________________________________	
13 Ian Vandewalker, “Election Spending 2014: Outside Spending in Senate Races Since Citizens United,” 




following Citizens United, as well as hints at how important receiving outside funding 
and dark money can be for a candidate to successfully win a close election, it does not 
closely examine the impact of such changes. 
 A study by Mann and Corrado did, however, seek to determine the significance of 
these changes in campaign finance laws.14 The study found that congressional party 
committees only spent $209.5 million in 2012 on elections, while non-party organizations 
spent over double the amount, $467.2 million, on independent expenditures. The authors 
argue that just because non-party organizations are outspending party organizations does 
not necessarily mean that the parties are weakened. They argue that often times non-party 
organizations’ goals align with those of the party and are simply another tool to further 
the election effort. Additionally, Mann and Corrado believe that donor preferences have 
had no impact on Democratic movement to the left that has occurred over time. They 
believe that this change resulted from a political change in the South and is driven by race 
and religion, not campaign finance. While Mann and Corrado propose a theory for the 
relationship, or lack thereof, between outside spending and polarization, they again do 
not test for any relationship between ideology and outside spending.   
 A study by Adam Bonica, on the other hand, did seek to relate campaign 
financing and candidate ideology by using campaign finance data to measure the 
ideology of candidates and contributors.15 The methodology of this study relies on the 
underlying assumption that contributors distribute funds based on how they perceive 
_______________________________________________________________________	
14 Thomas E. Mann and Anthony Corrado, “Party Polarization and Campaign Finance,” Center for Effective 
Public Management, Brookings, July 2014, www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Mann-and-Corrad_Party-Polarization-and-Campaign-Finance.pdf.  
15 Adam Bonica, “Mapping the Ideological Marketplace,” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 2 
(2014): 367-386, doi:10.1111/ajps.12062. 
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candidates’ ideologies. The study presents the spatial model of giving, which claims that 
contributors prefer the most ideologically proximate candidate possible over those who 
are more ideologically distant. While Bonica’s model does not control for “nonspatial 
candidate characteristics” that could affect PAC donation decisions, like incumbency 
status and committee assignment, he argues that individual donors are really only 
concerned with ideology.16 Bonica achieved external validity, as he found that his results 
correlate to the same liberal-conservative dimension as the respected roll-call measure of 
ideology, DW-NOMINATE. This study is relevant to my research, as it establishes a 
strong link between campaign finance and ideology, but it does not explore any 
relationship between extremism and relative levels of outside funding.   
 A study by La Raja and Schaffner did seek to directly relate campaign finance 
laws and polarization in state legislatures.17 They began by studying the campaign 
finance laws of all 50 states from 1990-2010 and for each election year, categorized the 
states based on limits these laws placed on campaign financing by parties. Importantly, 
they found that members of state congresses in states that did not limit party spending 
were significantly more moderate than those in states with laws restricting party spending 
and that “states with party-centered campaign finance laws tend to be less polarized than 
states that constrain how the parties can support candidates.”18 They argue that this is due 
to the tendency of political parties to fund more moderate candidates, as party 
organizations’ top priority is winning elections, while outsiders tend to fund ‘riskier’ 
_______________________________________________________________________	
16 Ibid., 369. 
17 Raymond La Raja and Brian Schaffner,  Campaign Finance and Political Polarization. (Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2016), 
https://www.press.umich.edu/4882255/campaign_finance_and_political_polarization.  
18 Ibid., 6.  
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candidates who more align with their own ideological positions. When there are less 
restrictive laws surrounding the use of party funds for candidates, the parties are able to 
play a more dominant role in the fundraising aspect of elections and therefore promote 
more moderate candidates. On the other hand, when parties are restricted during the 
campaign process, candidates are forced to turn to outside sources for fundraising, which 
again relates to the theory that more extreme candidates are better at attracting outside 
funding. This study is incredibly relevant to my research question as it highlights the role 
that changing campaign finance laws can have on polarization in state legislatures, while 
I will focus on how this affects the national legislature.   
 
Hypotheses 
 My null hypothesis (H0) is that there is no relationship between ideology and 
outside spending. My first hypothesis (H1) is that following the Citizens United decision 
there is a significant positive correlation between ideological extremism and the amount 
of non-traditional outside spending for a candidate, relative to other key campaign 
finance categories (party committee spending and individual donations that are given 
directly to the candidate’s campaign). In other words, the more extreme the candidate is, 
the more they will rely on non-traditional outside spending relative to party committee 
spending and direct individual donations as a source of campaign financing. My second 
hypothesis (H2) is that following the Citizens United decision there is a significant 
positive correlation between ideological extremism and the amount of non-traditional 
outside spending for a candidate relative to party committee spending only; meaning that 
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more extreme candidates will rely more on outside spending from outside groups than 
traditional party support.   
I propose that the increase in non-traditional outside funding and dark money 
following the Citizens United v. FEC Supreme Court decision has increased polarization 
in Congress. In order to receive funding from wealthy individuals, candidates often have 
to take more extreme ideological stances. As shown in the study by Vandewalker, outside 
funding is incredibly important, especially in close elections. As stated in the study by 
Heberlig et al, ideological extremists are more successful at fundraising, so it is likely 
that they will attract more outside spending. This suggests that ideological extremists 
will, therefore, have a better chance at winning elections and as more extremists are 
successful, Congress will become more polarized.19 Additionally, the increase in non-
traditional outside funding undermines the parties’ control over their members, making it 
more difficult for parties to force their members to cooperate or engage in compromise. 




 My dependent variable is relative non-traditional outside spending in elections 
and my independent variable is ideological extremism. For the data on outside spending, 
_______________________________________________________________________	
19 Since money is such an important factor in winning elections, if my hypotheses hold true and more 
ideologically extreme candidates do rely relatively more upon outside spending as a source of campaign 
funding, this may cause extremists to be more successful at winning elections than less extreme candidates. 
Unfortunately, there is currently no way to consistently and reliably measure the ideology of candidates 
who lose elections, so I will not be able to fully test this theory at this time. However, if there is a strong 
positive relationship between ideological extremism and outside funding it is likely that this does affect the 
chances of extremists winning elections. 
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I utilized the Center for Responsive Politics data set, which includes a list of every 
candidate in each two-year election cycle and contains information about the candidates 
such as their party, whether they won or lost, whether they were an incumbent, 
challenger, or running for an open seat.20 For each candidate, I have the amount of non-
traditional outside spending on their behalf in their election, the amount of traditional 
spending by their party committee, and the amount raised through direct individual 
donations to their campaign. For the purposes of this project, I will only be examining the 
winning candidates, as there is no data available about the ideology of losing candidates.  
 My independent variable is candidate ideology. For this, I relied on the DW-
NOMINATE data series by Poole and Rosenthal from Voteview, which ranks every 
member of Congress on an ideological scale from -1 to 1 (with -1 being the most liberal 
and 1 being the most conservative).21 The data contains a list of candidate names, 
ideology, chamber of Congress, and seat for every Congress.  
 It is also necessary to control for outside factors that could be impacting outside 
spending. Not much is known about what influences levels of outside spending, but the 
two major factors I controlled for are the ideology of the district for which the candidate 
is running and whether or not the seat is a ‘safe’ seat. In order to control for the ideology 
of the candidate’s constituents, I utilized data from the American Ideology Project by 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw, which provides a measure of the average ideology of a 
Congressional district using the Item Response Theory based on responses to the 
_______________________________________________________________________	
20 “Bulk Data,” Center for Responsive Politics, https://www.opensecrets.org/bulk-data/downloads.  
21 Jeffrey B. Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet, 
Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database, 2018, https://voteview.com/.  
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Annenberg National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study.22 
The ideology of the districts is ranked on a scale from -1 to 1, just like the measure used 
by the DW Nominate data to rank members of Congress. 
 In order to control for the presence of safe seats, I included a variable that 
measures the percent of the vote each party received in the previous election for that seat. 
For House elections this is the last election, two years previously, and for Senate 
elections this is the election six years previously. A safe seat is often defined as one 
where the party received over 55% of the vote in the previous election. In order to create 
a measure of this, I utilized data from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab. Their data 
sets contain constituency returns for elections to Congress from 1976-2016.23 This 
allowed me to calculate the percentage by which a candidate won each race.  
 My final data set included each winning candidate’s campaign finance history for 
a two-year election cycle broken down by type, the incumbent/challenger/open seat 
status, the candidate’s ideology, the ideology of their constituents, and the percentage of 
the vote their party received in that race during the previous election. 
 
Research Design  
 I began by summing the amount of funding each candidate received from 
different sources. I calculated the amount of non-traditional outside spending (excluding 
_______________________________________________________________________	
22 Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw, “Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, 
State Legislatures, and Cities,” The Journal of Politics” 75, no. 2 (2013), 330-342. 
23 MIT Election Data and Science Lab, "U.S. House 1976-2016", 2017.   
          https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IG0UN2; MIT Election Data and Science Lab, "U.S. Senate 1976-




party committees), traditional party committee spending, and direct individual donations 
received by each candidate. In order to control for the fact that some elections cost more 
than others, I created a variable that measures the percentage of funding candidates 
received from each source, relative to all three sources (non-traditional outside spending, 
party committee spending, and direct individual donations).  
 In order to test my first hypothesis, H1, I ran an OLS linear regression, with my 
dependent variable being the previously calculated ratio of non-traditional outside 
spending to traditional party spending and direct individual donations and my 
independent variable being the absolute value of candidate ideology. My controls are the 
aforementioned measures of constituent ideology, in absolute terms, and vote percentage 
by the candidate’s party in the previous election. This allows me to determine whether or 
not there truly does seem to be a statistically significant relationship between ideological 
extremism and the changes in campaign finance laws over time and therefore polarization 
in Congress.  
 In order to test my second hypothesis, H2, I again ran a linear regression. In this 
case, my dependent variable is the percentage of funding from non-traditional outside 
spending relative to party committee spending and non-traditional outside spending 
combined. My independent variable is again the absolute value of the candidate’s 
ideology and my controls remain the absolute value of the district’s ideology and the safe 
seat measure. This allows me to determine if there is a significant relationship between 
ideology and the candidate’s reliance on non-traditional outside spending versus 




 To start, I examined the pure relationship between different types of spending and 
ideology both before and after 2010, when the Citizens United decision was reached and 
the new campaign finance regulations went into effect. For the purposes of this model, I 
only looked at the incumbent candidates.  
 
Figure 1. Relationships between spending and ideology 
As seen in Figure 1, this preliminary analysis shows little to no change after 2010 
in the relationship between party spending and ideology and the relationship between 
direct individual donations and ideology. However, there does appear to be a noticeable 
shift in the relationship between non-traditional outside spending and candidate ideology 
before and after 2010. From 2002-2008, there was a slight positive relationship between 
the non-traditional outside spending’s share of a candidate’s total funding and their 






































































of their funding from non-traditional outside spending than more liberal candidates. 
However, after 2010, the relationship between the percentage of funding from non-
traditional outside spending and candidate ideology resembled more of an upside-down 
‘U’ shape. Small peaks are present around both .5 and -.5, which based on the histogram 
of ideology shown below appears to be the moderate or middle of both parties. This 
implies that more moderate candidates in each party are more likely to rely more on non-
traditional outside spending. This is the opposite of what my hypothesis initially 
predicted, but there are no controls present in this analysis as it simply strives to show the 
relationship between the two variables.  
 Next, I examined the proportion of funding candidates received from the three 
main categories: non-traditional outside spending, party spending, and direct individual 
donations. I broke this down into pre- and post-Citizens United election years and broke 
the candidates down into incumbents, challengers, and those running for open seats (see 
Figure 2). From this analysis, it is clear that the percentage of funding that comes from 
non-traditional outside spending changed fairly drastically for challengers and candidates 
running for open seats after 2010. The percentage of funding from party spending 
decreased slightly across the board for all types of candidates, most significantly for those 
running for open seats. The percentage of funding from direct individual donations 
increased slightly for incumbents and those running for open seats, but decreased slightly 
for challengers. This implies that non-traditional outside spending may be more important 




Figure 2. Funding Percentages 
 
 Next, I ran regressions to test my initial hypothesis, that there is a positive 
relationship between the ideological extremism of the candidate and a higher percentage 
of funding coming from non-traditional outside spending. I included the percentage of the 
vote the candidate’s party received in the seat’s previous election (as a control for a safe 
seat) and the absolute value of the candidate’s district’s ideology. As shown in Figure 2, 
changes in non-traditional outside spending following Citizens United differ between 
incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. For this reason, I chose to run separate 
regressions for incumbents and non-incumbents in both the House and the Senate, in 
order to determine if the relationship between ideology and non-traditional outside 
funding differs for different types of candidates. The results of these regressions can be 
































































































































































































































Note: standard error in parenthesis  
*the p-value for this coefficient is less than .05 and the t value if greater than 1.96,    
   making it significant  
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 As can be seen in Table 1, ideological extremism appears to play a role in 
determining non-traditional outside funding percentages in the House, but not in the 
Senate. After breaking this down further, it appears as though ideology only plays a role 
for House incumbent candidates. According to this regression, for every unit increase in 
ideological extremism, there is a corresponding decrease of .1545 in the percentage of 
non-traditional outside funding for House incumbents. This directly contradicts my first 
hypothesis, as it suggests that more extreme candidates receive relatively less non-
traditional outside funding relative to other methods of campaign financing. This model 
also has election returns playing an important role, as there is a .0922 decrease in the 
percentage of non-traditional outside spending for every unit increase in election returns, 
implying that less non-traditional outside spending is present in elections where the party 
won the seat by a relatively high percentage in the previous election. The district’s 
ideology, however, does not have a statistically significant effect in this model.  
In order to further examine this possible relationship, I broke down the data to 
assess any differences between the two parties. As can be seen in Table 2, among 
Republican candidates, incumbent House Republicans are again the only category of 
candidates where ideology appears to play a role in influencing the percentage of non-
traditional outside spending. According to this model, there is a .1648 decrease in the 
percentage of non-traditional outside spending for every unit increase in ideological 
extremism. Again, this contradicts my first hypothesis and implies that more moderate 
candidates are more likely to get relatively more non-traditional outside funding, not 
more extreme candidates. Election returns again are significant, with an expected .1073 
in non-traditional outside spending percentage for every unit increase in election returns. 
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This makes sense with my theory, as it is expected that less attention would be given to 
seats that are seen as ‘safer.’ District ideology again has no discernable impact in this 
model.  
Next, I examined the impact of ideology on non-traditional outside spending for 
Democrats, as can be seen in Table 3. Like the Republicans, there seems to be a 
statistically significant impact for incumbents in the House. After the Citizens United 
decision in 2010, for every unit increase in ideological extremism by a Democratic 
incumbent in the House, the percentage of non-traditional outside spending is expected to 
decrease by .1923. In this model, neither election returns or the district’s ideology have a 
significant impact. Interestingly, in the Senate before the Citizens United decision in 
2010, the model suggests that ideological extremism had a positive impact on non-
traditional outside spending percentage, but this phenomenon was no longer present after 
2010. Neither of these results supports my hypothesis, as I believed that there would be a 
positive relationship between ideological extremism and non-traditional outside spending 
that would become stronger after the Citizens United decision.  
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Table 2. Estimating Effects of Ideology on Non-Traditional Outside Spending for Republicans 
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
*the p-value for this coefficient is less than .05 and the t value if greater than 1.96,    




































































































































































































































































































































































Note: standard error in parenthesis  
*the p-value for this coefficient is less than .05 and the t value if greater than 1.96,    
   making it significant  
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 To test my second hypothesis, that following the Citizens United decision there is 
a significant positive correlation between ideological extremism and the amount of non-
traditional outside spending for a candidate relative to traditional party spending only, I 
ran another set of OLS regressions. As can be seen in Table 4, there is a positive 
relationship in the House between ideological extremism and the percentage of non-
traditional outside funding relative to party spending. For every unit increase in 
ideological extremism after Citizens United, there is expected to be an increase of .2184 
in non-traditional outside spending percentage relative to party spending. Both election 
returns and district ideology also have a significant positive correlation. There is also a 
positive relationship between ideological extremism and non-traditional outside spending 
in the House before 2010, and it appears to have a larger impact than it does after 2010, 
as every unit increase in ideological extremism causes a .2230 increase in relative outside 
spending from outside groups. However, when breaking it down by incumbents and non-
incumbents, the positive and statistically significant impact of ideological extremism is 
only present post-2010. For incumbents in the House, there is a .1928 increase and for 
non-incumbents in the House, there is a much higher .4501 increase. This supports my 
second hypothesis as it shows that the more ideologically extreme candidates are relying 
more on non-traditional outside spending than on traditional party committee spending, 
especially now that there are fewer limits on outside spending. Additionally, the fact that 
the relationship is stronger for non-incumbents helps to explain the significance of the 
shift following the Citizens United decision whereby non-incumbents receive relatively 
more funding from outside spending groups and relatively less funding from party 
committees (see Figure 2).   
Giusto	 24	













































































































































































Note: standard error in parenthesis  
*the p-value for this coefficient is less than .05 and the t value if greater than 1.96,    
 making it significant  
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 To further examine this relationship, I again broke it down by party. As shown in 
Table 5, ideological extremism only had a statistically significant impact on the amount 
of non-traditional outside spending, relative to party spending, in the case of non-
incumbent House Republicans post-Citizens United. According to this model, for every 
unit increase in ideological extremism, we would expect a .5056 increase in the 
percentage of non-traditional outside funding relative to party funding. This is a fairly 
significant increase and implies that non-incumbents in the House rely more on non-
traditional outside spending than party spending as a source of campaign financing. This 
supports my second hypothesis, as it shows a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between ideological extremism and non-traditional outside spending.  
 Next, I looked at the relationship between non-traditional outside spending 
relative to party spending and ideological extremism for Democrats. As shown in Table 
6, I again found that ideology has a statistically significant impact on non-traditional 
outside spending in the case of House non-incumbents. This model predicts that for every 
unit increase in ideological extremism there will be an increase of 1.0773 in the 
percentage of non-traditional outside spending relative to party spending. Like for the 
Republicans, this implies that ideologically extreme challengers or candidates running for 
open seats in the House rely more heavily on non-traditional outside spending relative to 
party spending. The influence of ideological extremism was again only significant after 
2010 when campaign finance law was changed by the Citizens United case. This again 
supports my second hypothesis as it shows a strong positive relationship between 
ideology and non-traditional outside spending that became more pronounced after 2010. 
Election returns also played a role in this model, with an expected increase of .4250 for 
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every unit increase in ideological extremism. This means that the greater the percentage 
of the vote a candidate’s party won in the last election, the more likely the candidate is to 
receive more non-traditional outside spending relative to party funding, which could be a 
result of outside groups feeling more comfortable supporting candidates that they believe 





















































































































































































Note: standard error in parenthesis  
*the p-value for this coefficient is less than .05 and the t value if greater than 1.96,    























































































































































































Note: standard error in parenthesis  
*the p-value for this coefficient is less than .05 and the t value if greater than 1.96,    
   making it significant  
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Conclusion 
 From the results of my analysis, it is clear that the relationship between ideology 
and non-traditional outside spending is not one that can be easily pinned down. In terms 
of the overall percentage of campaign financing, there is a negative relationship between 
absolute ideology and relative non-traditional outside spending for House incumbents. 
For Republican incumbents in the House there is an expected decrease of .1648 for every 
unit increase in absolute ideology and for Democratic incumbents in the House there is an 
expected decrease of .1923 for every unit increase in absolute ideology. This implies that 
for both parties more extreme candidates get relatively less non-traditional outside 
spending than other forms of campaign financing and that the effect is more extreme for 
Democrats than for Republicans. This would mean that there is no relationship between 
non-traditional outside spending and polarization in this case, as the funds are not being 
spent on behalf of the more extreme candidates.  
 When examining just the relationship between ideological extremism and the 
relative amount of non-traditional outside spending compared to traditional party 
committee spending, a different effect appears. There is a significant positive relationship 
between absolute ideology and relative non-traditional outside spending compared to 
party spending for non-incumbent candidates in the House. For Republicans there is an 
expected increase of .5056 for every unit increase in absolute ideology and for 
Democratic non-incumbents in the House there is an expected increase of 1.0773 for 
every unit increase in absolute ideology. This supports my initial hypothesis that more 
extreme candidates get relatively more non-traditional outside spending than traditional 
party funding. The effect also appears to be stronger for Democrats than for Republicans.  
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While this could result in outside spending having a small impact on polarization, 
if more of it does indeed go to the more ideologically extreme candidates, there are far 
fewer non-incumbent candidates and it is unlikely that the overall impact on polarization 
in Congress is large. However, if this trend continues, it could affect non-incumbent 
candidates’ chances of winning elections. Ideologically extreme non-incumbents may be 
able to spread their messages farther and increase their audiences through the help of 
outside spending groups, instead of having to rely on their party committees who may be 
less likely to invest time and resources if they do not deem the non-incumbent candidate 
worth the risk. Clearly, investigating this theory necessitates more data and, therefore, 
requires more time to have passed since the Citizens United decision, but it is certainly 
worth tracking in the future.  
 Interestingly, there appears to be no significant relationship between ideological 
extremism and non-traditional outside spending in the Senate. However, this may be 
because there are fewer Senators and their elections occur far less frequently, so there is 
currently a limited amount of data available as the Citizens United decision is still 
relatively recent.  
 As it stands, the relationship between ideology and non-traditional outside 
spending deserves further analysis. My research found that there is a negative 
relationship between the percentage of non-traditional outside funding and ideological 
extremism for incumbents in the House and that there is a positive relationship between 
non-traditional outside spending relative to traditional party spending and ideological 
extremism for non-incumbents in the House. These results are worth revisiting as we 
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learn more about what other factors influence outside funding and as more time passes 
after the Citizens United decision, causing more data to be available.  
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